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Enough Symbolic Landmarks But No Real Difference
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By Sher Alam Saqib
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The U.S. administration and Afghan
people all know that it is nine years
that international forces are struggling for bringing peace and stability. There have been enough symbolic landmarks over the last nine years after the Taliban regime was ousted from Kabul in late 2001. For instance, the country has experienced two cycles of presidential and provincial council elections. It is going to experience the second cycle of parliamentary elections on September 18, less than two weeks from now. Afghanistan has 34 elected provincial councils across the country, a body that can bridge the government and people and monitor the state of affair and development in the provinces. But nine years on the country is not stable enough to justify tremendous sufferings Afghan people, security forces and foreign troops have undergone in post-Taliban period. We are facing an increasingly skeptical public both in Afghanistan and in western capitals.
Providing a secure environment for the vote to take place on September 18 will be an enormous challenge for the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and U.S. forces in different parts of the country where a burgeoning insurgency has rendered large swaths of territory unsafe for travel, particularly in the south. With around 130,000 foreign soldiers operating in the country, people will be disenfranchised this time because many polling stations have been closed due to security problems. It is usually claimed that today’s Afghanistan is completely different from decade ago when the hard-liner Taliban outfit had established an autocratic regime and forced opponents either to surrender or to leave the country. It is true that today’s Afghanistan is and should be different from Taliban’s period of rule of terror, oppression and strangulation. But the real difference is yet to be created but unfortunately we are not going towards that difference instead there is a retrogression trend. Rivals in today’s Afghanistan are yet to, instead of using gun resolve their disputes through political means and peacefully. Again it is expected that there will be a low turnout, which will be an indication of just how bad the situation is in Afghanistan. We can no more justify that just holding an election is a success. That is not. Success can be defined as reducing the suffering of people, alleviating poverty, generating job opportunities and ensuring permanent peace to the people. But we are having the opposite of what could form a success in a mission. Obviously, the security of elections is very important in order for it to be a free and fair election. And every Afghan who makes the decision to vote ought to have the freedom and the security to do that. There are parts of the country where that will be not happen or that will be difficult. This is an Afghan-run election. It is going to be supported by security, primarily by Afghan police and Afghan army elements but as it emerges from the current status quo there will be more challenges to on polling day than last year. Fewer election allies and meetings have been held by people in favor of certain candidates in different provinces and the process of campaigning is going on amid security concerns. We have already witnessed untoward incidents as a candidate and some campaign workers have been killed. Afghan people see a strengthened insurgency attempting to move the country backward, rampant corruption that prevents service to be delivered to the people effectively and efficiently, backbreaking poverty and lack of job opportunities.
Afghanistan has lost golden opportunities during the last nine years, under President Hamid Karzai’s leadership. He has failed to achieve the goals he had promised to the people. Afghans are for quick turnaround, durable peace and stability. But president Karzai seems to be walking to opposite direction. There are more questions about the future course of peace and stability to be addressed, than the progress made over the course of last nine years. The current discordance on how to deal with growing insurgency, fight rampant corruption, eradicate opium further complicates the situation and thus blur the prospect for peace to be established in the country. In fact, justice-based peace has not turned into a credo to dominate the minds in the country. As there are warnings coming out about the fact that the timetable for beginning to pull out the U.S. soldiers next year gives boost to Taliban militants, the hard-line insurgents have already begun to mount their deadly attacks to demonstrate their ability to continue until foreign troops set out to abandon Afghanistan.
In the meantime, the Taliban militants have been attempting to seep into northern and peaceful areas of the country. NATO and US military officials have conceded, the fight in Afghanistan is “tough and getting tougher”. With violence at its highest since the 2001 invasion, a continuing absence of reliable Afghan security forces and the thriving poppy trade funding the Taliban insurgency, the US is in for a long battle that will inevitably require a longer military presence. It is worth mentioning that the lax approach towards Taliban militants, insurgent groups and their foreign supporters has led to the current chaos and growth of insecurity. One should also criticize President Hamid Karzai for calling these brutal militants as his “disgruntled brothers.” Time has shown that his efforts, though emanating from his good intention to bring peace to the country, have not produced any desired result. In fact, this has also contributed to providing the opportunity for the Taliban and other insurgent outfits to gain upper hand and have the feeling of victory. While the Taliban have upper hand in some key parts of the country and feel that they are going to win, pursuing reconciliation plan without military pressure will lead to more insecurity and provide the militants with time to operate freely and orchestrate their attacks more easily. While foreign forces should only withdraw when Afghan forces are ready and able to take over, it should be mentioned reconciliation can only yield result when the Taliban militants are squeezed enough and till that time it should be suspended.
Sher Alam Saqib is the permanent writer of Daily Outlook Afghanistan. He can be reached through mail@outlook afghanistan.com
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Recession Geopolitics
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By Harold James
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The news that China has overtaken
Japan as the world’s second larg
est economy did not come as a surprise. This is the major geo-political outcome of the Great Recession of the early twenty-first century – one that carries both economic hope and political fear.
First, the good news: the economic side of the case.China’s response of to the world economic crisis is the central reason why the financial turbulence that emanated from the US sub-prime debacle did not completely destroy the world economy and lead to a repeat of the 1930’s Great Depression.
In a famous analysis of the Great Depression, the economic historian Charles Kindleberger argued that it arose from a failure of world leadership. Great Britain had been the hegemonic power of the nineteenth century, but its creditor status had been severely eroded by the cost of fighting World War I.
The United States had emerged from the war as the world’s largest creditor, but it had a double vulnerability. Its financial system was unstable and prone to panics, and its political system was immature and prone to populism and nativism.
In the Depression, according to Kindleberger, the US should have provided an open market to foreign goods. Instead, the Smoot-Hawley Tariff Act closed off American markets and provoked other countries into a spiral of retaliatory trade measures.
US financial institutions should have continued to lend to distressed borrowers, in order to prevent a spiral in which credit rationing forced price reductions and intensified world deflation. Instead, US banks, widely blamed for the international lending boom that preceded the bust, were so intimidated and weakened that the flow of American credit stopped.
After World War II, as a leading figure in developing the Marshall Plan, Kindleberger set about applying these lessons: the US should keep its markets and its flow of funds open to support other countries.
How different the twenty-first century looks! It is as if China’s leaders were the star pupils in one of Kindleberger’s courses. Throughout the crisis, the Chinese economy continued to grow at an amazing pace, in part as a consequence of massive fiscal stimulus. When anyone wants an example of how effective a Keynesian counter-cyclical strategy can be, internationally as well as domestically, they need look no further than China’s four-trillion-renminbi stimulus of 2008-2009.
Apart from a six-month period after the September 2008 collapse of Lehman Brothers, in which trade finance stopped and the world did look as if it was close to Great Depression circumstances, China and other emerging markets helped those export-oriented industrial economies to recover. The surprising strength of the German economy, with more vigorous growth than at any time in the past 15 years, is due to the dynamism of emerging-market – particularly Chinese – demand, not only for investment goods, engineering products, and machine tools, but also for luxury consumer products. Germany’s high-end automobile producers are now operating at full capacity.
China also followed Kindleberger’s financial lessons. For a moment, it looked as if a contagious crisis, driven by fears of government over-indebtedness, would destroy the politically fragile compromise that European countries had carefully constructed over a 50-year period. The turning point in this spring’s euro panic came when big holders of reserve currencies signaled that they saw the need for the euro as an alternative to the increasingly problematic dollar and the equally vulnerable yen. China started to buy European Union governments’ bonds, and a high-profile Chinese team even went to Greece to buy under-priced real assets.
It was not just Europe that benefited from China’s willingness to take on the mantle of “lender of last resort.” The new-found dynamism of African economies is a consequence of the Chinese drive to build up and secure sources of raw materials.
But there is a problem with Kindleberger’s argument. Kindleberger, a kind and well-meaning man, could never see that the world is never entirely grateful to the country that saves it. Being a hegemon is a thankless task. The beneficent effects of China’s engagement in the world economy are felt much more powerfully farther away from China. In that sense, too, there is a parallel with the story of the US, whose leadership was felt much more positively in Europe than it was in Canada, Mexico, or Central America.
It is not surprising that the greatest and strongest ideological opponent of the American way of life was not in distant Europe or Asia, but in Cuba, just 90 miles off the Florida coast. Since the early twentieth century, Mexicans have felt worried and threatened by American strength. And, in the same way, Taiwan and Vietnam feel that they will be the Chinese giant’s first victims.
The global hegemon has never been loved by its neighbors. But the US gradually, if imperfectly, built up trust through multilateral institutions. Europeans did much better at reconciliation with their neighbors after WWII, in part because the malign and evil conditions of Nazi rule made it necessary to talk about the past in terms of moral categories rather than power politics.
In contrast to America’s engagement in multilateralism, or Europe’s search for reconciliation through a plethora of common institutions, power politics is much more a part of Asia’s twentieth-century legacy. The real challenge for China’s leaders will be to develop a coherent view of the world that does not scare the people just across the border.
Harold James is Professor of History and International Affairs at Princeton University and Marie Curie Professor of History at the European University Institute, Florence. His most recent book is The Creation and Destruction of Value: The Globalization Cycle.
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Afghanistan’s Struggle to End
the Mine-Related Disasters
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Afghanistan still suffers the very brutal aftermaths of long decades of war which
obviously can not be limited to lawlessness, state-building obstacles, poverty,
social disorders and security. Every day the average 60 people throughout the country fall prey to different kinds of landmines left over from the past and the joint government and international efforts have cultivated promising results with long way ahead to prevent more causality and handle the life affairs of disabled Afghans.
Afghanistan has jointed the countries committed to Ottawa Treaty which calls for Convention on the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on their Destruction to provide updates on their progress towards meeting their commitment to landmine clearance and victim assistance. According to the Ottawa Treaty, Afghanistan should have cleared all landmines and Explosive Remnants of War (ERW) by 2013. So far, almost half of the hazards have been cleared, however, the challenges ahead remain great and there is an estimated 512 km² still to be cleared. One important success of Afghanistan over the last year has been the training of 14,000 teachers in mine risk education and the integration of mine risk education into the National Curriculum.
Dr Haider Reza, Programme Director, Mine Action Programme for Afghanistan, says: “Since becoming a State Party to the Ottawa Treaty in March 2003, Afghanistan has made impressive progress towards our goals. However, the challenges area great: the scale of contamination, the challenging terrain of much of the country and ongoing insecurity means that we need more support and creative approaches than ever before.”
A challenging obstacle to achieve the mine clearance goal is the new tactic used by Afghanistan’s armed opposition fighters. Despite public hatred and rampant humanitarian tragedy, they are using placing landmines to target coalition and Afghan forces, in large cases, this targets innocent people and cause irreversible humanitarian costs. The government and international sources may need to fight this anti-human menace with accelerated parallel strategy of physical clearance action and moral obligations on all parties to prevent and stop community-impacting measures. No one in Afghanistan can afford a big generation of disabled people; even the current expanded number has serious miseries with no immediate solutions.
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It is Wrong to Question
Importance of the Mission
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It is clear that the costs of war in Afghanistan have started to worry our international
allies. It is in the vital interests of all to win this war and to complete the mission
successfully. But no one is satisfied with the current trend of operations and progress in Afghanistan. The challenge of resurgence is appalling and formidable. The uncertainty on how to best address the challenge of a violently resurgent Taliban adds to the complexity of the situation. There are different views on the way the operation should go forward and the mission should be completed. But it should be understood that it will be a mistake to question the importance of the struggle in Afghanistan. President Obama clearly referred to the point of importance when he said there is “a clear mission and defined goals—to disrupt, dismantle and defeat al Qaeda and its extremist allies.” President Karzai made ambitious commitments.
The ability to be demonstrated by president Karzai is important for maintaining international support. But it should be clear that it is not only president Karzai whose government has had serious flaws, it is also the international community whose strategy has not worked and whose presence in the country has not paid off and has not yielded tangible results to be seen in people’s lives. Added to that, winning the war is not only in the interest of Afghanistan, it is also in the interest of all regional and international countries involved or have a stake in stable Afghanistan.
President Karzai said, “We believe that our friendship with the United States of America is not limited to our joint struggle against violent extremists and the forces of division and destruction; rather, it is based on Afghanistan’s long-term interests towards the consolidation of stability and tranquility for our people in this region… I am fully confident that this friendship will further expand. The people of Afghanistan will never forget the sacrifices made by American soldiers to bring peace to Afghanistan. Afghanistan is determined to take all the necessary steps towards strengthening US-Afghan relations… Afghanistan hopes to acquire the status of a major non-NATO ally of the United States.”
It should be mentioned that we should not expect success from president Karzai alone. Of course, President Karzai should no longer fail to provide services for and keep happy the people of his country and should not fail to root out widespread corruption. But in the meantime it is the international community that has to demonstrate strong commitments and take clear practical measures to tackle the violent insurgency.
Therefore, it is important to note that success does not come from one side rather it hinges entirely on concerted efforts. Passing blame can deal a detrimental blow to these efforts and just provide context for the enemies and weaken the will of the allies.
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The Next Afghan Election
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In less than two weeks, Afghanistan will elect a new parliament — a chance to show
that the country is making progress. Unfortunately, the odds of success may not be
much better than they were last year, when a presidential election, marred by violence and widespread fraud, left Afghans and the international community questioning the legitimacy of Hamid Karzai’s victory.
Millions of Afghans courageously voted in past elections and may do so again. There are 2,447 candidates on ballots in 34 provinces, including about 400 women (up from 328 in 2005) despite severe constraints on their political participation in this male-dominated society. Still, there are many reasons to worry. Security is the biggest obstacle given the worsening insurgency. Four candidates have been killed in attacks by suspected Taliban fighters even with a buildup in American forces and an escalation in allied military operations. Armed men also killed five campaign workers for a female candidate. Many candidates running for 249 parliamentary seats are too fearful to campaign, and some have told reporters that the violence, especially suicide attacks, is much worse than last time. Election officials say it is too dangerous to even open at least 938 of 6,835 polling centers — most in the south and the east. The threat of another fraud comes close behind. When Mr. Karzai ran last year, his allies stuffed so many ballot boxes that the Electoral Complaints Commission ended up throwing out one-third of his votes. Mr. Karzai won by default after his opponent dropped out. That disaster prompted calls for major electoral reforms. There have been some — but not nearly enough. The most significant may be Mr. Karzai’s appointment of a new chairman of the Independent Electoral Commission, which oversees election logistics. His predecessor failed to adequately prevent or punish fraud.
The new chairman, Fazel Ahmad Manawi, an Islamic scholar and former I.E.C. commissioner, is generally viewed as doing a better job. He barred 6,000 people who worked on the fraudulent November poll from administering this one, improved ballot security, and publicized polling sites weeks — rather than days — in advance.
The United Nations-backed Electoral Complaints Commission — the election’s ultimate arbiter — is reconstituted, although experts are concerned about the competence of the new members. Their big test will be whether they have the courage of their predecessors to expose fraud if found. It will be hard to pull off credible balloting. The election is hampered by a flawed voter registry, a vetting process that left far too many corrupt warlords on the ballots, and fewer independent observers. Reports of vote buying, bribery and intimidation are rife; Mr. Karzai shows no sign of discouraging this.
It would be better to postpone the election. But American and allied officials say Kabul wants to proceed, and they must respect that decision. While the allies pressed the Karzai government on reforms, they seem curiously resigned to whatever may happen.
In the remaining weeks, the allies should press Mr. Karzai and other major political leaders to urge all Afghans to vote, to speak out against fraud and corruption and to pledge that violators will be punished. No one expects Afghanistan to install a perfect system overnight. But cynical and disenchanted Afghans need to see there is a way for their voices to count. (Courtesy The NY Times)
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Targeted Killings Don’t Help Peace
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Here we go again. Even as the storm over the WikiLeaks’ disclosures refuses to blow over, the New York Times talks about a crucial but little noticed shift in the US strategy in Afghanistan.
Turning President Barack Obama’s original strategy of “surge” and engagement on its head, the US is now pursuing an indefensible and dangerous policy of “targeted killings” in Afghanistan.
The US-led coalition’s new policy is simple: just hunt and kill the insurgents. And the coalition hopes it will break the back of the insurgency, forcing it to the negotiating table before the US starts departing by July next year.
The new policy also does not gel with the original approach of General David Petraeus, the architect of Iraq and General Stanley McChrystal’s successor in Afghanistan, who has advocated a broader policy of increasing troop presence to secure Afghan cities and towns as well as political engagement with Taleban. Which begs the question, who really is in-charge in Afghanistan? And why has the US turned to these desperate measures?
The answer is, after nine years and expending $300 billion on this hopeless war, the US-led coalition is clearly finding the going tough even as the Taleban grow stronger by the day.
The pressure of a self-imposed deadline of withdrawing from Afghanistan by July next year, as announced by Obama last year, doesn’t help either. Also, it is suggested that a similar strategy of “hunt and kill” has worked for the coalition in Iraq.
But Afghanistan is not Iraq. Unlike Iraq’s flat plains, the mountainous Afghanistan has always been a nightmare for the occupation powers and an ideal territory for guerrilla fighters. The Russians realised it rather late after the invasion in 1979.
If the US and its allies had drawn their lessons from the Soviet debacle in Afghanistan, they wouldn’t be in the mess they find themselves in today. As we have argued in this space before, a political solution remains the best and honourable way out of the Afghan quicksand for the Western coalition.
Washington’s so-called counterterrorism strategy – a euphemism for the old fashioned killings – is not only going to spectacularly fail in Afghanistan, it is going to further alienate the civilian population. As it is, a whopping majority of the Afghan population is angry with the coalition for its reckless bombing of civilian areas.
Even President Hamid Karzai, chosen and anointed by President George W Bush no less, has repeatedly protested against the coalition’s cavalier attitude to civilian lives. Last week even as the world was waking up to the horror exposed by WikiLeaks, the Afghans buried scores of innocents killed in the coalition bombing.
If President Obama is serious about wrapping up the Afghan mission by next year or at least by the end of his tenure, he would do well to encourage General Petraeus and Karzai to urgently explore a political settlement. Killings – no matter how cleverly targeted—have never helped anyone build peace. Especially not in Afghanistan. (Courtesy Khaleej Times)
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