With violence going on in a number of provinces across the country, the Afghan government is seeking assistance from local armed groups to tackle the Taliban offensive in the North. Media reports say that thousands of armed men from former jihadi groups are preparing for take up arms and resist the Taliban. According to the reports, the government has called on Jihadi figures to back up the government in the fight against the militant groups. However, officials have suggested that the government is not going to promote a policy of rearmament in the country, saying that it only supports grassroots resistance against the Taliban. Sediq Sediqi, the spokesman of the Ministry of Interior said the MoI supports ‘public resistance’ against the Taliban, but does not distribute arms among the people.

Seemingly, the Afghan government avoids publicly confirming a new approach of fighting against the Taliban and pursuing a policy of arming locals for fighting the Taliban. The logic for this is clear. The government is quietly moving to mobilize locals against the Taliban to contain the Taliban spring offensive in provinces where Afghan army and police have limited or minimal presence. Despite the government’s denial of pursuing such an approach in the anti-insurgency campaign, it seems the government sees this approach less costly and far more effective for curbing the Taliban seasonal fighting in Northern provinces of the country. Despite the news surfacing, the government’s reticence over the issue is indicating that it is not going publicly endorse mobilization of ordinary people for the fight as it could be potentially dangerous for the long term.

In short term, there is no doubt the policy would work effectively to keep the Taliban at bay and fail their spring offensive. The Afghan army and police forces are struggling with tackling the Taliban spring offensive in a number of provinces including Kunduz, Takhar and other provinces. The Taliban this year have deployed thousands of fighters in the north to fight as part of the groups’ spring fighting. The government needs to match the militants in fighting whether through deployment of more security personnel or by mobilizing locals to fight the Taliban.

However, there are widespread fears that if people get armed, it could potentially undermine security and stability in the future. Many still remember the era of the civil wars in the country, when there was complete anarchy and chaos across the country. It is a fact that arming ordinary people and local groups for fighting against the Taliban could be a potential risk for future security of the country. However, for time being and the foreseeable future, armed local groups are less violent than the Taliban. The Taliban is now virtually threatening the government’s stability and the ANSF’s sustainability. Such groups have efficiently defended their areas from the Taliban without committing intolerable atrocities.

The government can promote a safer approach of arming ‘resistance groups’ against the Taliban. The best policy for helping public resistance against the Taliban is to engage in supporting locally committed groups who are responsible for security of their own localities and towns. This would prevent creation of large and irresponsible groups operating beyond their areas. Another approach the government can count on is to help individual anti-Taliban figures who are loyal to the government to rise as commanders of the grassroots resistance against the militant groups. In addition to that, the government can somehow control and oversee operations of local anti-Taliban groups by Afghan military and intelligence agencies.

Anyhow, the dangers of such a policy could not be refuted. But it is a proved tactic that will help ease the brunt of war from the shoulders of the overwhelmed Afghan security agencies. An explicit example of formation of forces beyond army and police ranks is establishment of the Afghan Local Police (ALP). Initially president Karzai was bitterly against the idea proposed by American commanders to imitate their experience in Iraq in forming local resistance groups against the insurgents. The former president finally agreed to formation of the ALP when assured of his government’s control over the locally engaged force operating beyond formal military establishment.

The ALP has been effective in securing the highways and small towns in some most volatile provinces in the south and north. It has been criticized though in some provinces for committing actions such as violence and lootings. Still, the ALP has remained largely responsible and under strict control of the government. The government can use its past experience of formation of the ALP in controlling and overseeing local resistance groups. Formation of the ALP has not been disastrous for Afghanistan, and so the promotion of local resistance groups will not be a catastrophe for the country if they are managed efficiently.

However, there are already signs of alarms for promotion of local armed groups in some insecure provinces that are largely out of the government’s control. The policy of supporting local resistance groups cannot be applied to every province as they can easily join forces with the anti-government groups. The government should pursue the policy only in provinces that are considered as safe and propitious for such a policy. The public apathy towards rearmament of non-committed groups is justified. But the impacts could be mitigated through sound and calculated policies, while the result for tackling the resurgence of the Taliban could be remarkable.

The Afghan army and police forces are losing men at an alarming rate. The government needs to boost the reinforcement for the fighting and help morale of the ANSF. The Taliban fierce offensive along with high casualties of the security personnel as well as attrition rates in the police and army ranks is consuming the strength of the ANSF. The government should take dedicated plans for the containing the spring offensive through better equipment of the ANSF as well as promoting local resistance against the Taliban. For any approach in the war, the government needs to have clear and calculated policies to convince the public and help the anti-insurgency campaign.