Nuclear proliferation in the sub-continent, has led to South Asia’s Cold War, ideationally rooted in collective memory and materially underpinned by the dynamics of power politics in the region. The diametrically opposed interests of India and Pakistan mean that the two countries will pursue their strategies individually. Analyses of South Asian nuclearism take two polar positions in explicating the effects of nuclear weapons in the sub-continent. The first argues that their advent has made for a more stable South Asia, circumscribing armed conflicts and terminating major wars by the logic o f deterrence . The se co nd claims that nuclear proliferation has destabilised India-Pakistan relations, in particular, and South Asian security in general, by encouraging aggressive Pakistani military postures and massive conventional build ups on either side of the Line of Control (LoC).
Statement of the problem
In the South Asian context, we are faced with a unique situation. Both the adversaries locked in hostilities are nuclear armed. Any actual use of the weapon is likely to be suicidal. On the face of it, this equation should provide a credible deterrent to war. However, this has not happened. The stability, which many strategists thought would descend on the sub-continent with the acquisition of nuclear weapons, has continued to be elusive. In overall situation, it is said that the ability of the threat of use of nuclear weapon has removed the actual use of nuclear weapons to achieve certain specified objectives in a conflict. So far nuclear weapons have been used only once and that too against a non-nuclear weapon state. When the US bombed Hiroshima and Nagasaki, it could do so because it faced no threat of equal retaliation.
Presently, providing strategic stability is the main plan of the US foreign policy in South Asia, meaning “Keeping open the opinion of using India to help counter-balance China, whenever that prove necessary. Stability, viewed in this context certainly involves preventing any war between India and Pakistan and generally controlling reducing the level of political violence in South Asia.” The Bush Administration indication that the subject of non-proliferation should not stand as the obstacle to the maintenance of the US-India relationship based on common interests. Now non-proliferation and arms control are no longer on the agenda of the Bush Administration. On the other hand, nuclearisation has not fundamentally made India secure, and given its proclivity to project itself as a developing country, the test have not enhanced its international standing either. Even though China is in a similar situation, it still manages to be treated as a great power. This situation is largely a reflection of C h i n a ’ s w i l l i ng n e s s t o a s s e r t i t s p o s i t i o n a n d f a c e t h e consequences.
Dilemmas of nuclear power states
India’s democratic tradition, however, makes its task more difficult as contending view points have to be taken into consideration. In the sense, the process of finding a common national position is all the more difficult for India than it is for China. At best, nuclearisation has provided India a temporary strategic depth vis-a-vis the global constellation of powers. It is entirely up to India to exploit this window of opportunity, to rearrange its priorities in order to enhance its economic progress, bring about greater social cohesion and political stability. India’s quest is for great power status and not just for survival. It wants to play a pre-eminent role in global politics.
Broadly speaking, the concept of security includes the practices involved in the physical custody of weapons and sensitive nuclear materials that will prevent theft or sabotage, and control procedures that will prevent unauthorised tampering with, access to, and use of nuclear weapons. Normally, it is defined in two contexts–strategic and technical. The strategic concept also refers to ensuring safety and survivability of nuclear weapons under all conditions - peace, on alert in crisis, and war. Safety implies measures to prevent nuclear weapons from being involved in accidents and to permit them to perform as intended. While survivability refe rs to force deployment, mobility, dispersal, and hardened silos for weapons and command centres that will make nuclear weapons is vulnerable. In the technical sense , stability implies compre hensive ly configuring the command, control, communication, and intelligence systems that guarantee a retaliatory second-strike capability, which the adversary must perceive as credible.
However, in any case for o ptimal de te rre nce crisis st ability must be as sure d. By implication wars and dangerous military practices must be eschewed and command configurations made robust to meet high security requirements, provide communication redundancy, and obviate hair-trigger deployments that entail the risk involved in delegating authority to military field commanders. In the context of nuclear stability, each and every question must be answe re d in full with no roo m for an incorre ct answe r. Requirements of stability and the elaborate arrangements as applied during Cold War day stand valid today as Quinlan has written, ‘Requirements do not, however, decrease proportionally with size; it is not to be supposed that a small nuclear force does not need sophisticated control–indeed, small size may entail potential vulnerability that heightens demands’. In other words, the re is a Zero tolerance for mistakes in nuclear management and the fact that command systems are still evolving in South Asia poses great risk.
Possible solutions
For stable nuclear deterrence, three criteria must hold. The first pertains to the credibility of nuclear weapons system and the resolve of a country to use them, and the perception the adversary holds about these issues. Second, neither side must believe it can destroy its opponent’s nuclear capability in a preventive or pre-emptive attack. The third criterion is fulfilled when nuclear forces meet the above two stability conditions under all circumstances. In general, South Asia currently meets the first criteria of stable deterrence, as both sides sufficiently understand the capabilities of the other. The second condition is linked with the decision-making system in each country and the perception that adversaries have of that system. For the present, the second criteria remains shaky and uncertain in South Asia. An outside analyst might conclude that in practical terms neither Pakistan nor India could successfully execute a pre-emptive attack. But the lack of trust on both sides in the process through which decisions are made in the other State means that this criterion of stability remains unrealised. The third condition is also problematic under the conditions of South Asia. Till date in managing their nuclear arsenals, both India and Pakistan have demonstrated nuclear discipline during peacetime, as well as during the crises of recent years. The balance of power relationship is a dynamic one that needs continuous adjustment in the relationship to ensure equilibrium a pre-emptive attack.