2012 will be a year of follow-up conferences for Afghanistan to achieve what the US and its NATO allies failed to do in 2011. Coming summer will prove a test of the security transition, capacity and capabilities of Afghan National Security Forces as insurgents will increase attacks in areas transferred to Afghan Army. The year will be decisive regarding talks with the Taliban and increasing domestic political demand and international realization for radical changes in the government system in Afghanistan.
With the US Presidential Election campaign on peak, Obama, in reelection bid, will seek to keep his promise of troops' withdrawal plan which is being resisted by Pentagon, and boost up efforts to complete the narrative of the endgame in Afghanistan through some sort of a 'political settlement' and talks with the Taliban, which I strongly doubt can make any breakthrough this year.
Conferences have been planned to work out this narrative of the endgame, starting with the 5th Regional Economic Construction Conference on Afghanistan (RECCA) to be hosted by Tajikistan in Dushanbe on March 26-27. It will be followed by Kabul International Conference in June to seek regional cooperation on the prospects of making a regional consensus on objectives which could not be achieved in the Istanbul Summit last year.
The international community is expected to ensure pledges of continued aid throughout the Transition to Transformation Decade of 2015-2025 in the Tokyo International Conference on Afghanistan in July. The Karzai Administration has been trying to attain some sort of a guarantee on international economic assistance.
The NATO Summit in Chicago on May 20-21 will discuss the continued assistance to sustain the Afghan National Security Forces, which will require about $10 billion annual costs throughout the Transition Decade. The NATO Summit will discuss the joint Afghan-ISAF assessment following the condition-based transition plan endorsed in the Lisbon Summit. They might come up with a more palpable arrangement and clearer withdrawal deadline, depending on the terms of US-Afghanistan strategic partnership agreement on presence of American troops beyond 2014.
The agreement is expected to be finalized before the NATO Summit, depending if Kabul and Washington make an understanding on the deadlock about Karzai's demands that night raids be ended, control of prisoners given to Afghans and an end to impunity of Americans in Afghanistan.
The Americans are not going to accept the end to impunity and night raids, but might give in on prisoners' control. The uncertainty of US plans about Afghanistan beyond 2014 has left its NATO allies in confusion. There are clear differences among top US officials, between the State Department and Pentagon. There still remains the doubt if this confusion will be clear before the NATO Summit in Chicago and a common roadmap is produced.
This year will be a test of the transition plan when insurgents will increase attacks in summer, particularly in the areas where security control has been transferred to Afghan National Security Forces. The second phase of transition has brought almost half of the Afghan population under security responsibility of ANSF. The NATO Summit in Lisbon which endorsed the transition plan made it clear that transition means Afghan forces taking lead, not an exit plan of international troops.
The Chicago Summit, though the agenda is not clear yet, might discuss a concrete roadmap on ISAF withdrawal. The capability tests of ANSF this year and other factors such as the willingness of America's NATO allies to share greater financial burden in Afghanistan at the time of international fiscal crisis will determine that roadmap.
Talks about talks with the Taliban could not produce any starting point in 2011. With the reports of a 'political office' for Taliban in Qatar, the uncertain US exit strategy narrative will give us a 'political address' for insurgents in 2012. But I don't see prospects of any breakthrough in reconciliation process. Nor the US, neither the Afghan Government has a clear vision for this.
Even if some elements of the Taliban's Quetta Shura with approval of Mullah Omar show willingness for an eventual political settlement, which is unclear how it will look like, the question about Haqqani Network, Hekmatyar's Hizb-e-Islami and other Taliban groups who are operating in Afghanistan from Waziristan quite outside the influence of mainstream Taliban leadership will remain critical issue.
However, the sense of uncertainty among Afghans towards the international community's commitment to Afghanistan has resulted in a more coherent political evaluation of the country and its future. All the political leadership in opposition are more expressive of the fault-line in Afghanistan—being the over-centralized presidential system imposed by the international community in 2001.
President Karzai has already started preparations to remain in power beyond the constitutional limit of two-terms in office, through a deal-making of power-sharing management or other constitutional maneuvering.
Recently a leaked BND German intelligence report said President Karzai's preparations for the Bonn Conference included discussions on removing the constitutional limit of two terms in office, which could be easily done through his manipulation of the Loya Jirga and a deal-making with any faction of the opposition.
Recently a tribal meeting of elders from Kandahar—Karzai's hometown—was held in Kabul hosted by Qayom Karzai, President's brother. Reportedly, the gathering was to discuss "the start of an election campaign".
There is a possibility that Karzai will go to any level of confrontation with the international community and not hesitate from domestic manipulation of all kinds to stay in power for 3rd term. Lack of alternative leadership cannot be an excuse for the international community or the United Nations for that matter, to shy away from avoiding such manipulations.
Regardless of the fact that reconciliation with the Taliban might not reach a breakthrough before the 3rd Presidential elections in 2014, the democratic process is needed to continue and improve, with full support of the international community.
There are three major opposition blocks, who offer an alternative to the Karzai Administration's policies. The reformist Hizb Haq wa Edalat (Right and Justice Party), coalition of ethnocentric heavyweights National Front, and the National Coalition led by former Karzai rival Dr. Abdullah.
Fundamental demands in the manifesto of the National Front and National Coalition are call for radical change in the system. Both parties are advocating for a federal parliamentary administrative system for Afghanistan. Similarly, they oppose the current approach of reconciliation with insurgents and demand for greater transparency of the process. The National Front has publicly called for a UN-led process of genuine reconciliation in Afghanistan.
These new political alliances made in the last few months of 2011 will rally mass mobilization on these issues in 2012, and the international community will increasingly realize that an overly centralized system is a recipe of political instability for Afghanistan in the Transition Decade. They and the Karzai Administration will have to listen to these popular demands.
This article was first published in January 2012 edition of Pragati: the Indian National Interest Review magazine.