The news of peace parleys and the incremental flow of progress that comes out of Qatar and Germany have kept the media here in Afghanistan on the hook. The Dari and Pashtu language media here are abuzz with much excitement and activity with the flow of "commentators" and "political affairs experts" a non-stop feature on most of the Afghan private TV channels. What is particularly interesting is that all this activity and excitement in the Afghan media and on its TV channels sit uneasily in contrast with the apathy and indifference of the common people here - for Kabulis days pass by as usual and what matters more than the outcome of this decade-old war is whether the climbing prices of petrol and liquified natural gas will come down any time soon amid this biting cold of the winter.
The outcome of the multi-year old secret negotiations between Americans and what are reportedly "representatives" from the Taliban have now resulted in some measure of understanding between the involved parties on creating a political office for Taliban in the Qatari capital of Doha. However, a number of issues that are, to an extent, downplayed need to be pointed out and made clear.
The Taliban remain a largely fragmented front with ideology and a commitment to fight against the invaders acting as the cohesive force and the glue that keep together as varied and heterogeneous groups of fighters under on a single platform and battlefront.
It is yet not clear what faction and wing of the Taliban the so-called "representatives" stand for. One key person thought to be close to Mullah Mohammad Omar is reportedly involved in the talks but the fact remains that it is next to impossible to deal with the Taliban as a single and united entity.
Mullah Mohammad Omar stands more as a spiritual leader and not even much of an operational leader, let alone being the Taliban's CEO! Winning the trust and approval of a number of Taliban representatives and leaders during these peace talks does not guarantee the success of the peace talks and an end to this decade-old war; it would merely open yet another long chapter of seeking out negotiations with many more leaders and factions that have been out of the talks and may very well be impossible to persuade due to their being much more ideological.
The NATO and the ISAF-coalition forces report that the field commanders of the Taliban are being replaced with younger and more ideological commanders. This is, by and large, a result of the extensive kill and capture operations which have killed and eliminated the mid-level, older and more experienced commanders. Talking and persuading these new commanders would not be easy for the senior leadership of the Taliban who remain inside Pakistan.
Secondly, it is too early to get excited and carried away by the contradicting and hazy news coming out of Qatar and Germany. It is too early and premature to even term the news of the Qatar political office a 'breakthrough' in talks.
Two years from now, you might very well still have thousands of insurgents fighting in Afghan towns and villages and a handful of so-called Taliban representatives sitting somewhere in Doha, Qatar. Moreover, it is still too early for a more inclusive and more representative grouping of Taliban leaders to be slowly drawn into these U.S.-sponsored talks and negotiations.
For any talks to have durable outcome in the context of Taliban and Afghanistan, it is an inescapable necessity that almost the whole range of senior leaders within the Taliban be dealt with at some point in the future. In order for these talks and parleys to become serious and include some very 'strategic' questions such as Taliban sharing in the power, then there are many other Taliban leaders whose presence in talks is necessary.
The "representatives" in Germany and Qatar are not that representative of the Taliban as a whole after all! They, obviously, do not have that level of authority (whether moral or operational) to make decisions on behalf of a varied and heterogeneous movement.
One important weakness in the American approach to these talks and negotiations is that the U.S. is being too fast and in a hurry (dictated partly by domestic pressures) to take these talks with Taliban to a face-saving conclusion. This is in contrast with the fact that Taliban have proved many times before that they are patient when it comes to politics. The allegations that the Taliban are engaging in these talks more for the sake of securing the release of their prisoners seems to be an accurate estimation.
The major point of contention is that the so-called Northern Alliance and the major non-Pashtun leaders and even communities, somehow, must be directly involved in any talks with the Taliban if the outcome of the talks is to be comprehensive and durable.
For this purpose, these leaders and communities must be given a share in the talks through a platform other than the government of Afghanistan. The hostilities between the Taliban and the Northern Alliance is still very much a reality of today's Afghanistan and a major determinant of whether there is peace or war in the country.
The point is that the Taliban, at some point during these talks, should sit directly with the Northern Alliance factions, open the bag of previous bitter experiences, open up to each other and patch up the differences. These are inescapable conditions if the peace talks are to result in a durable outcome.
The Northern Alliance is as much the Taliban's enemy as is the U.S. and this fact cannot be and should not be ignored and swept under the carpet. The fact that the U.S. is being too fast and in a hurry to push through the talks is a worrying and unsettling fact.
The U.S., in the process, might lose sight of and turn a blind eye on some very important ground realities, some of which was discussed in this article. However, the recent talks involving Qatar are worth being pursued vigorously by the U.S. and the government of Afghanistan. The share of the government of Afghanistan under President Karzai should be a constructive one rather than one of suspicion and hostility.