On Thursday, three American soldiers were shot dead by an Afghan man in uniform in restive Helmand Province in the south, according to NATO sources. Meanwhile, the Afghan officials have claimed that shooter was not an Afghan army but a local commander who invited American soldiers to his house in order to discuss a possible creation of local police force to fight against Taliban. So, when the American soldiers got into his house, who indeed was a Taliban devotee, shot and killed them. Anyhow, it is highly possible that the man was in uniform because everyone is aware of the severity of the situation and lack of popularity in the south; it seems really hard that American soldiers stepped inside his house without security precaution.
Of course it was not the first attack of its kind. Recently, the so called blue-against-green attacks have increased tremendously. The foreign security forces have been the main target of such attacks and their Afghan fellows generally stood out. If it continues on its current spiraling level, perhaps, the level of foreign casualties will soon surpass the level of casualties dealt to NATO as result of direct fighting with militants.
After looking at the series of anti-foreign security forces by men in uniforms, it is reasonable to worry about the future when there would not be strong and well-equipped foreign security forces anymore to challenge the notion of possible insurgents’ resurgence.
No matter how strong the international community tries to send message that it will not leave Afghanistan once again to hands of mercy of the day, but instead will remain committed to its security, political stability and economic prosperity, but post-2014 will be period that Afghan government would shoulder the security challenges alone. Certainly, according to Washington officials, the United States will not pull its soldiers entirely out and there will be, perhaps, few thousand to train Afghan security forces, but what if Taliban infiltrators are not less among ANA and ANP?
The frequency and continuity of the attacks can reveal the harsh reality that Taliban sympathizers are not less among Afghan security establishments. Those who turn up and open fire against Afghan or foreign fellows, they are indeed the core elements who like suicide bombers do not care about their lives. Because they are certainly aware of the consequences of their attacks and likely understand that they wouldn’t make out alive, but still they turn weapons and shoot their foreign fellows. Perhaps, the only thing that always nudges their minds is that when to find opportunity to carry out attacks with maximum possible casualties.
Definitely, all militants are not ready to die for the cause; however, they all notice the possibility that anytime they might get killed, fighting Afghan Security forces and foreign allies. But if the situation alters in a way that dead becomes certain, only a minor stick to Mullah Omar and the rest of course defect. Those who remain they are the core and key player in the establishment, not of Taliban but in any organization.
When I am saying that those who turn weapons against foreign security forces and understand that there is no hope for remaining alive; they are the key elements as well as the real extremists who fight mere for ideology. Thus, simple sympathizers are distinguished from this portion of militants. The high frequency shows how remarkable numbers of Taliban main elements has infiltrated the government! Since January, around 20 of the so-called blue on green attacks are reported which have left 27 foreign soldiers dead. It is not clear how many others are on the line, seeking opportunity to turn their weapons and shoot foreign soldiers.
The situation looks more worrisome considering the increasing frequency of such incidents. In many such attacks, more than one individual was involved. Perhaps, the number of Taliban infiltrators not less and just a month ago, many Afghan police defected and joined Taliban ranks in the south along with commander named Mirwais. It is not clear how many are on the line seeking for opportunity to attack foreign allies or defect at the right time. Thus, the number of those, who if their lives do not fall into certain danger turn against their fellows, is possibly high. Additionally, the number of those who feel sympathy with Taliban and are not willing to fight against them should be remarkable.
The question is how these sympathizers could have joined Afghan security forces? Previously, I have written about the issue and explained how the procedure of recruitment, nepotism, ethno-centrism and other forms of corruption have helped militants to easily get into. Here once again I want to highlight that the very policy of communal representation and invisible hands of officials in the process of recruitment are the two main factors that paves way for infiltration. Since there is no accurate data about the percentage of ethnic groups, nobody can determine the percentage of each ethnic group in the power structure.
For example, only nine percent from Hazara community can be recruited in ANA. Annually thousands of people participate in military entrance exam and score quite well comparatively, but are rejected because, it is argued, percentage has already completed.
Moreover, the ethnic sentiments still dominate the national sentiments. It has been a question for me how Taliban infiltrators remain unnoticed for a long time. It is possible the his fellows may identify him as sympathizers of Taliban but still avoid to report due to mere communal sentiment. There are various solutions, but empowerment of intelligence is much favorable one. Yet militant failed to infiltrate within and it has remained somehow popular body within power structure. Thus, its empowerment can indeed do a lot in identification and detention of insurgents.