Gilles Dorronsoro is an academic expert on Afghanistan, Turkey and South Asia. He is currently a resident scholar at the Carnegie Endowment which has published its latest paper by him. For most of its part, it is another typical piece predicting 'failure' in Afghanistan that has become fashion in Washington think-tanks reports nowadays.

I recommend a full-read of the 30-pages paper. Below are some excerpts with commentary.
Predicting a Taliban momentum in 2013 and 2014, he says Kabul "will confront three crises essentially simultaneously: an economic crisis sparked by the drop in Western spending, an institutional crisis as the end of President Karzai's term approaches, and a security crisis as the Taliban are expected to launch an advance beginning in the summer of 2013.

Western spending will probably drop to less than $5 billion a year after 2014, compared to more than $100 billion in 2011 from the United States alone. It is clear that the United States and its allies are not particularly enthusiastic about financing the Afghan government, partly because of widespread corruption.

The civilian surge pledged by the State Department has never materialized, and USAID funding has also begun to decline. Of course, the impact of decreased civilian aid to the population will not be as significant as it could be since much of the funding has not reached the populace; a large part of the aid was rather siphoned off by Western companies and the elite connected to the regime. Furthermore, the aid was not evenly dispersed, with the majority spent in Kabul and in the most heavily disputed provinces.

The withdrawal's economic impact will be most strongly felt in relation to the reduction of spending linked to the troop presence, particularly on infrastructure projects. The end of the wartime economy will likely trigger an increase in drug manufacturing, but the funds from those enterprises will not be enough to compensate for the reduction. All of this will lead to economic crisis."

Mr. Dorronsoro gives comprehensive analysis of the economic challenges, but his comments about the institutional crisis seem to lack insight. He boldly claims the Presidential elections in 2014 will not be feasible to be conducted due to security threats, followed by the parliamentary elections. Reading his prediction about Loya Jirga and election failure, many questions remain unanswered.

"Increasingly, people are developing exit strategies. Regardless of what they tell their diplomatic contacts in Kabul, the political elite are preparing to go into exile, scrambling to obtain foreign passports, moving their families to Dubai, and shifting massive amounts of money abroad. The sharp decline in high-end real estate prices in Kabul signals that disengagement is the most common attitude.

In addition, the new Afghan middle class, whose existence is directly linked to the Western financing and support, is not politically mobilized and will not be a factor in the transition process. No organized segment of the urban population is ready to support the current government in the coming crisis.

The Western withdrawal will also lead to a security crisis as the Afghan National Army and the Afghan National Police struggle to confront the Taliban. Following the example of the communist regime after the Soviet withdrawal in 1989, the Afghan government will have to streamline.

Its security system and focus on withstanding pressure from the insurgency. The land seized by the insurgency is gone for good because the Afghan army's structure is essentially defensive and thus incapable of recapturing lost territory. Maintaining control of Afghanistan's major cities and main transport corridors is thus the only realistic goal."

Mr. Dorronsoro's assumptions make good news for the Taliban. "Their strategy will become more offensive as the withdrawal changes the balance of military power. With this shift, the Taliban could muster hundreds of men, perhaps thousands for a military operation—enough to capture a district capital. In preparing for the post-withdrawal period, the Afghan National Police and Afghan Local Police have become the Taliban's main targets. And the insurgency's targeted assassinations, which are to some extent a response to NATO's strategy, are directed mainly at figures likely to unite pro-government forces at the political level."

Beginning in spring 2013, the Taliban will probably step up attacks throughout the country to test the Afghan National Security Forces' defenses. Progress is most likely in their two strongholds, the south and the east.

The academic says certain scenarios could change the game—based on his assumed predictions. "At first glance, the mechanisms leading to the fall of the regime seem inexorable. But certain developments could stabilize the situation for a few years, such as a change in Pakistani policy, internal divisions within the Taliban, and a new president. In reality, these developments are unlikely and would come about only as a result of unpredictable events—a major political crisis in Pakistan or the death of the Taliban's spiritual leader Mullah Omar, for instance.

Instead of supporting the insurgency and providing the Taliban sanctuary on Pakistani soil, Islamabad could in theory take an active role combating insurgents on its territory. Such a reversal of Pakistani policy could deal a severe, even fatal blow to the Taliban and remains the most certain way to stabilize the Afghan regime. But a change in Pakistan's policy has been announced regularly for the past ten years, and it has never taken place. Indeed, the Pakistani military never ceased its support for the Taliban and Hezb-i-Islami, another insurgent group, and became an increasingly difficult U.S. "ally." It is highly improbable that change will come in the future for several reasons."

Gilles Dorronsoro's paper is a recommended read. It presents few post-2014 scenarios. However, I believe, he still fails to cover the complex arena and effects of Afghanistan's domestic factors compared to the NATO withdrawal strategy.

Particularly his analysis about the political military scenario in the North lacks serious insight resulting in author's flawed conclusion. He says, "Politically, the north is far from stable and very fragmented. Historically dominant parties such as Jamaat-e-Islami, Jumbesh, and Hezb-i-Wahdat take different positions or are divided internally.

Furthermore, political parties do not have their own structures and are essentially state parasites, with strongmen who monopolize power at the provincial level and (generally) benefit economically from the system. In particular, they have no military structures independent from the Afghan National Army that would enable them to resist a Taliban offensive. It seems unlikely that northern political factions could unify politically and militarily to become a player on the national scene. One recent attempt to unite the north into a nationally recognized body has made little progress.

The Jebhe-ye Melli (National Front) was launched in late 2011, but the structure has no real military presence on the ground, no program, and its activities are very limited. Nor does the group have any political project, as the parties that comprise it represent local interests or advance ethno-political claims that do not constitute a national platform. Indeed, it is hard to see what kind of program could develop, outside of a vague call for a form of decentralization at the provincial level."

Reading this part of Dorronsoro's paper, for once, I could not believe the serious lack of insight after his excellent analysis of the economic and institutional challenges for Kabul, and the militant, NATO strategy.