The doom prediction for Afghanistan after 2014 continues in Western think tank reports and op-ed analysis. The latest report is by the International Crisis Group. Titled as "Afghanistan: The Long, Hard Road To The 2014 Transition", it has the best analysis of our institutional crisis, lack of constitutional clarity and prospects of collapse of the current system due to political instability after any mishandling of the presidential polls in 2014.
It is unfortunate that Palace spokesman says the report is to pave grounds for 'foreign' meddling in elections. The Karzai Administration should take the recommendations of the ICG report seriously, rather than calling it "rubbish" and "nonsense".
I have written repeatedly on this page about the institutional crisis, challenges in the current setup and need for electoral reforms. The ICG report puts these issues in an excellent analytical narrative. Following are excerpts for readers who can't bother to read the 34-page report.
Institutional rivalries, conflicts over local authority and clashes over the role of Islam in governance have caused the country to lurch from one constitutional crisis to the next for nearly a decade. As foreign aid and investment decline with the approach of the 2014 drawdown, so, too, will political cohesion in the capital.
To ensure political continuity and a stable security transition, action to correct flaws in the electoral framework and restore credibility to electoral and judicial institutions is needed well before the presidential and provincial council polls. Tensions have already begun to mount between the President and the Wolesi Jirga (the lower house of the National Assembly), as debate over electoral and other key legal reforms heats up.
Opposition demands for changes to the structures of the Independent Elections Commission (IEC) and Electoral Complaints Commission (ECC) and an overhaul of the Single Non-Transferable Vote (SNTV) election mechanism have become more vigorous by the day.
At a minimum, the IEC must announce a timetable and a plan for the 2014 elections that adhere closely to constitutional requirements by December 2012, and a new IEC chairman must be selected to replace the outgoing chairman, whose term expires in April 2013, as well as a new chief electoral officer.
Under the current constitution and electoral laws, the government is not equipped to cope with legal challenges to polling results. Nearly a decade after the first election, parliament and the President remain deeply divided over the responsibilities of constitutionally-mandated electoral institutions.
The IEC, its credibility badly damaged after the fraudulent 2009 and 2010 elections, is struggling to redefine its role as it works to reform existing laws. There is also still considerable disagreement over whether the ECC should take the lead in arbitrating election-related complaints.
Institutional rivalry between the high court and the constitutional commission, however, can no more be resolved by presidential decree than it can by a simple parliamentary vote. Constitutional change will ultimately be necessary to restore the Supreme Court's independence and to establish clear lines of authority between it and the ICSIC.
Even if wholesale constitutional change is not possible in the near term, legal measures must be adopted within the next year to minimize the impact of institutional rivalry over electoral disputes and to ensure continuity between the end of Karzai's term and the start of the next president's term.
A move to a parliamentary system is required to ensure the broadest possible access to government and enfranchisement of Afghan citizens. Constitutional change is an inevitable step towards negotiating a lasting peace with all elements of the opposition. The sooner the government and its international backers acknowledge this, the closer the country will be to a path toward sustainable stability.
All this will require more action by parliament, less interference from the president and greater clarity from the judiciary. Failure to move on these fronts could indirectly lead to a political impasse that would provide a pretext for the declaration of a state of emergency, a situation that would likely lead to full state collapse. Afghan leaders must recognize that the best guarantee of the state's stability is its ability to guarantee the rule of law during the political and military transition in 2013-2014.
Afghanistan's political leaders have a maximum of eighteen months to prepare for an election and ensure a smooth transfer of presidential power. Many key tasks must be finished much earlier, particularly regarding electoral over-sight.
Resolving both the long crisis over electoral administration and related constitutional disputes could well be the key to determining whether the current political system will survive the 2014 NATO drawdown. Failure in either would be a crippling blow to chances to generate popular trust in a regime already regarded as highly corrupt. The international community must realize this is its last best chance to leave a viable state in Afghanistan and mobilize accordingly.
Rationalizing and updating the voter registry has posed considerable challenges, given the lack of systematized geographical information and standard personal identification documents, as well as longstanding disagreements over district boundaries.
In any case, it seems highly unlikely that the national ID process will be completed in time for the 2014 elections, leaving few options to correct the current voter list. An August 2012 feasibility study conducted by UNDP concluded that mere update efforts would essentially duplicate previous attempts, and inconsistencies with data on record would confuse matters further. It recommended that an entirely new voter registry be compiled using a phased approach in which voters would register at specified polling centers across the country over six months.
In insecure and remote areas, they would be allowed to register at a polling centre one or two days before the election. Some 16,000 teams would use optical mark technology to match voter cards to the list, at an estimated cost of $79.1 million. Experts familiar with the proposal are optimistic about its viability but warn that procurement and logistical hurdles will increase as the campaign season approaches. The IEC will need to launch the new registration process no later than November 2012 if the effort is to succeed.
The Afghan government has no alternative: it must move fast to ensure that electoral laws are passed in a timely manner; defects in the constitutional order are addressed; and rule of law is reinforced as the transition unfolds. All stakeholders must understand that rule of law is the most essential ingredient in the recipe for stability.
International military officials can ill-afford to make promises they cannot keep at this most delicate time in the mission. ISAF and Afghan security officials would do well to begin planning now for the possibility that elections may only be held in limited areas of the country, if at all. Planning should also begin for the possibility that a run-off will be required between the two candidates receiving the most votes; it is highly improbable that a second round could take place under tight security conditions in the two-week timetable prescribed by the constitution.