As people are living under the shadow of uncertainty and have no clear picture of what will happen after foreign military withdrawal in 2014, political officials constantly emphasize on the capability of Afghan security forces to deal with any possible contingencies independently.

But there is no doubt for people who have witnessed during their life time or read in the pages of history books of fall and rise of governments some of which was far stronger comparatively, considering the time and period of their existence. Some key figures and organizations highlight the possibility of political instability and even breakout of civil war. But definitely there are other promising factors which indeed keep the candles of hope in light, like the commitment of international community in protecting government against existential threat, war-fatigue, etc.

Anyhow, the cacophony of instability has paved the way for figures and groups to be assertive from supporting or opposing positions to government. Days ago, in the western Herat Province, tens of former Jihadi commanders and thousands of their supporters came together to discuss the role and challenges ahead of Mojahedin after 2014. While protesting the government and the international community for what they called as struggle for marginalization of former Jihadi leaders they voiced out their preparation for playing critical role in restoration of peace and security after 2014, if required.

The main lecturer in the gathering, which was organized by people of Afghanistan's Jihadi council, was Mr. Ismail Khan, an influential former Jihadi commander in the western provinces and the current Minister to Ministry of Water and Energy. He turned the edge of his sharp criticism towards NATO/ISAF, particularly, US for collecting the arms of Mojahedin. "They collected our arms, instead armed white American and European girls to bring peace, but failed".

He also heralded of revival of Jihadi groups to fight against foreign conspiracies. He also claimed that Mr. President was aware of reformation and regrouping of Mojahedin as cautious corps to fight along with Afghan security forces in lack of NATO/ISAF. It should be noticed that the President' office has not reacted over his allegation.

Recently, some local news agencies published a report, quoting Heart officials as saying that Ismael Khan was secretly and illegally distributing arms among people. However, it is not clear whether the report is authentic or not, But if it is true, the government has not held any step to control such an irresponsible move, which certainly may lead to creation of an alternative force to Afghan security establishments not, as some claim, in alignment with them.

I think the entire philosophy of such move is based on two principles: one, arming civilians to defend from themselves and their communities against militants like, formation of local police under leadership of government and, second dragging former Jihadi groups back to political scene. Sincerely, I am against both, considering the context of Afghanistan. However, nations mobilized the civilian force to fight against foreign invasion were successful. We have tens of successful stories of mass civilian mobilization across the globe and also in our own political history. Afghans fought several wars with great emperors and finally could defeat them because they were spontaneously mobilized to defend their soil and territorial sovereignty.

Despite all those successful stories which support the notion of arming civilians, I am against the move and maintain arming people or restoring former Jihadi groups will only lead the country towards self-fueling turmoil because of differences in contexts. Those successful stories are generally related to foreign invasion, while we presently are not under the invasion of any country. However, many know that neighbors are interfering to domestic issues but such interference is not that sharp to fuel giant antagonism with the neighboring countries nor people are in consensus and in state to hold arms against such hidden intervention.

Thus, arming civilians or restoring Jihadi groups indeed means to mobilize them to fight against insurgent groups who definitely had or still have close relation, let's be realistic, with some of the Jihadi commanders. Some of the top leaders of Taliban used to fight along with Jihadi commanders, who are now holding key positions in the government, against Soviet Union and government of Dr. Najibullah. Even Osama bin Laden who was the mastermind behind 9/11 attacks on world trade center in New York, which caused the international community to focus on the growing global danger, was a key financer of Jihadi leaders during 80s.

There is no guarantee if some Jihadi commanders take arms and do not shift to insurgent groups when the popularity of Kabul government has terribly affected due to growing problems and its ineffectiveness in delivering essential public services. In addition, we do not have a concrete social structure.

During decades of instability and communal and sectarian war, social structures have been terribly damaged if not ruined. The communal differences are bold enough to prevent the formation of any anti-frontline against Taliban and other insurgent groups nation-wide, cross-lingual and cross-communal. It is highly possible that Jihadi groups will turn arms against one another on communal basis instead of supporting Afghan security forces to restore peace and security.

This threat is not illusionary. We have experienced not years ago, after Soviet Union withdrawal and collapse of communist government, Mojahedins turned against one another. Therefore, it is suggested that government should always avoid formation of force under any names because it is always possible that they may shift the front porous, instable and naively-weaved social and political fabric.