Since the September 11, 2001 the Americans declared a serious war on terrorism worldwide due to a wide network of Al-Qaeda bases. All the diplomats around the world worked tirelessly to assemble one of the greatest coalitions in history. Most nations of the world offered support against terror; 122 countries offered military forces, 31 nations have deployed more than 14000 troops in support of operation enduring freedom in Afghanistan.
The military effort in Afghanistan has been breathtaking in its effectiveness by working with local Afghan forces opposed to the Taliban coalition forces used an imaginative combination of 21 century technology and the 19th century military tactics, teaming air power advanced communications, precision guided munitions with thousands of Afghan warriors on foot and some on horseback to overwhelm their adversary.
American troops destroyed Al-Qaeda's bases in Afghanistan, killed and captured many of its operatives and put the rest on the run.
Approximately 650 enemy combatants are now under US control. At the same time the American troops and their allies have helped to liberate the Afghan people from the oppressive rule of Taliban and their Al-Qaeda supporters. After 11 years of combat mission, many analysts consider political solution vital, for enduring peace established, in the war-torn Afghanistan. The conflicts lie between various decision makers, stake holders and key players, strategizing the procedure of peace talk.
Pakistan is deemed to have a crucial role in making peace talks happen between Afghan government and the Taliban leadership. Consequently a bilateral negotiation began last week, between Pakistan and Afghanistan High Peace Council (AHPC), to discuss the means of bringing the important Taliban leaders on the table of negotiation so that they could partake in peace building measure in post withdrawal Afghanistan. Afghanistan High Peace Council (AHPC) is a body of the Afghanistan Peace and Reintegration Program, appointed by Hamid Karzai to negotiate with elements of the Taliban.
The Council is chaired by Salahuddin Rabbani, son of late President of Afghanistan Burhanuddin Rabbani, after his deliberate assassination. A high level delegation of Afghanistan's High Peace Council (AHPC) led by Salahuddin Rabbani visited Islamabad, last week upon the invitation of Pakistani Foreign Minister Hina Rabbani Khar. The delegation called upon Pakistani President, Prime Minister, Foreign Minister, Chief of Army Staff and Pakistan's religious and political leaders.
The two sides urged Taliban to undo ties with Al-Qaeda and other international terrorist networks. To facilitate the peace talks, the two countries agreed to work with international partners to remove the names of blacklisted potential negotiators of Taliban and other groups from the UN sanction list.
The bilateral negotiations yielded the release of 13 insurgents including some important Taliban's leaders, by Pakistani government, who might be useful to Afghan authorities. However, the released insurgents do not include Mullah Abdul Ghani Bradar. His release has been a long time demand of Afghan government. Bradar is Taliban's second in command and is believed to have intention of talking with Afghan government. He is of course, the one, after Mullah Omar, who can be considered by HPC to initiate peace talks with.
Earlier US peace talk failed with Taliban given the two significant partners Afghanistan and Pakistan were not taken on board. President Obama has recently spoken of al-Qaeda and extremist elements as America's main problem is not the Taliban. Such careful language seems aimed at opening a door to talks.
Peace talks between the US and the Taliban broke down in March mainly because the Afghan insurgents refused to agree to a deal by which guerrilla commanders released from Guantánamo Bay would remain under Qatari government supervision in Doha and after a failure to agree the fate of five insurgents, including three Taliban commanders, held in the Guantánamo Bay detention camp. In return, a US soldier, Bowe Bergdahl, was to be freed by a Taliban affiliate, the Haqqani network, as part of a sequence of confidence-building measures leading to a ceasefire and broader talks between Kabul and the insurgents.
The main reason of US failure initiating peace talks was the trust deficit between US and Taliban. Without seeking a good intentioned help of the rest of two actors, a self driven move might not lead to fruition. Pakistan and Afghanistan and US trilaterally can drag forth this dilemma of peace talks to the status of acceptance. Pakistan should perpetuate unconditional support to Afghan reconciliation move by persuading Taliban, join peace talks as demonstrated, currently.
Afghanistan peace initiators should seek consent of all stake holders including opposition, devise an agreeable stratagem of political rehabilitation of Taliban, provided that the sanctity of constitution is prioritized, women and human rights are valued and its link to Al-Qaida and any international terrorist organization is publically denounced.
The role of US in this regard is significant. US must appreciate, encourage and endorse such moves given that eternal peace can only be dreamed in Afghanistan after all the dissents are re-politicized. Obama administration should announce a heavy spending on developments and educational projects in Afghanistan, substituting the spending on withdrawal of 45,000 more US troops, as part of the battle to win hearts and minds.
Afghan citizens must not be kept in dark regarding the compatibility of such negotiation as they have to decide which methods work best for them. An informed debate involving multiple actors and stake holders is far preferable to presidential pronouncement based largely on palace deliberations, powerful members of the High Peace Council, and Mr. Karzai's own druthers. Specifically, the Afghan parliament probably needs a major role in approving any peace deal, whether the current constitution is read as requiring that approval or not.
Nor should a simple majority approval be viewed as adequate. Indeed, every minor ethnic group, most affected by Taliban regime, constituting greater majority, in the country should probably have effective veto power over the deal, meaning that if a simple majority of its parliamentary members vote against the deal, it should probably not stand. This is the only way to minimize the risks of dissents that the wrong deal could produce.
All democratic set ups rest on power gained through effective public participation and strongly renounces the use of might of any sort; however Taliban extensively uses violence against innocent citizens and governmental infra-structure inflicting heavy losses to poverty stricken country.
The price of an eventual reconciliation should not result in re-association of Taliban, given notable positions to take over southern provinces perhaps Helmand and Kandahar and western regions, allowing them to impose strict religious laws, tolerate former insurgents to take government posts, and given free hand to undermine women's rights, democracy and nation-building. The price of reconciliation may also be a vibrant Afghanistan forth lying, where Taliban actively participate in building measures of the country by joining main stream politics, seems to be a day dream.