Omar Samad, former Afghan Ambassador to France and Canada has a survey analysis paper for the US Institute of Peace. Titled Perceptions of Politically Engaged, Influential Afghans on the Way Forward, it covers countrywide participants from all ethnic background and gender. The views expressed portray a general outlook of uncertainty among Afghans about future and their appreciation of the achievements of last 12 years after the US and NATO intervention. I concur with overall perspective of the participants and believe the Western mainstream media and policy think-tanks should listen to Afghan voices more than the so-called regional experts and arm-chair analysts. Below are excerpts from the paper.
“Most consider that security has deteriorated and are skeptical about the 2014 end date of international combat operations. Most are in favor of a small contingent of international forces to be deployed after 2014. Mistrust of neighbors seen as interfering is widespread, as is the belief that regional dynamics have a major impact on Afghan stability. The majority are equally critical of Afghan foreign policy but do not think that Afghanistan is a threat to others. Border demarcation issues, most believe, should be addressed through a consultative process, as should water rights through international mediation, to help de-escalate regional tensions and act as confidence-building measures. Terrorism is deemed as sourced outside the country, and the Taliban’s strength is seen as tied to external factors. A negotiated political end to the conflict is considered ideal, as is a U.S. role in that process. Most do not believe that the Taliban would agree to the current political order or constitution, but some are willing to negotiate elements of democratic values and gender rights.
“Afghans do favor free, fair, and transparent elections for 2014 but ask for more consultation and transparency. The majority does not believe that the current political system was imposed and consider democratic values essential for social and political stability. Approximately half of the respondents demand a more decentralized regime through a constitutional review and reform process but do not believe the country is ready for political parties.
Corruption, weak governance, militant attacks, foreign meddling, narco-business, and criminality are agreed to be among major challenges facing the country. Most of those surveyed pin their hopes on concepts of peace, tolerance, democratic rule, education, rule of law, employment, and international support. They do not see an alternative to democratic governance.
More than half called for an increase in nonmilitary international commitments, indicating concern regarding the decline of international attention and funding expected after 2014.
Most of those interviewed disagreed with the decision made at the NATO summit in Lisbon, which called for a complete disengagement from combat by the United States and ISAF in 2014. They also widely believed that the U.S. preoccupation with the Iraqi campaign beginning in 2003 shifted priorities and resources to a different theatre and facilitated the reemergence of insurgents in the Afghanistan-Pakistan (Af-Pak) tribal belt by 2005.
Although complimentary of overall ANSF progress, respondents displayed a sense of uncertainty about the cohesiveness and ability of ANSF to withstand Taliban attacks after 2014 if international assistance is reduced sharply. Many referred to the 1992 downfall of the Najibullah regime soon after the Russians stopped providing financial resources to the Kabul regime as an example. A majority believe that the military intervention has not fully achieved its objectives as initially defined in 2001.
Meanwhile, the vast majority of respondents were in support of the 2012 U.S.-Afghan Strategic Partnership Agreement. They consider it as a guarantor of enhanced stability and long-term growth. The majority was also in favor of the presence of a smaller contingent of U.S. and allied forces to perform specific duties after 2014—a reference to the sensitive bilateral security agreement (BSA) talks under way between the United States and Afghanistan since November 2012. The BSA’s main focus is on residual troop numbers, scope of duties, judicial immunity, and time lines for training and advising activities.
Consequently, the majority of those surveyed were eager to see Afghan forces and institutions perform better. However, given the reality on the ground, they expected that the international community, especially the United States and NATO, would continue to be involved in training, advising, and equipping once the combat mission has ceased.
Like many Afghans, those interviewed for this study were concerned about regional dynamics and thought that a large part of their three-decade-long problems were rooted outside their borders. They also believed that many of the solutions to the threats posed by the insurgency and spread of radicalism needed a constructive neighborly response and engagement, coupled with international prodding and engagement.
To this end, most respondents consider Afghanistan’s regional policy inconsistent and primarily reactive. The Afghan public, however, has continuously empathized with President Hamid Karzai for his longstanding efforts at convincing the United States and other NATO countries that the ideology and structures that sustain radicalism and terrorism are not based in Afghanistan, advocating a need for a wider regional approach.
Survey respondents considered the sanctuaries for Afghan Taliban fighters and the Haqqani network in Pakistan, and Iranian covert support to other insurgent groups, as part of a wider regional strategic calculation aiming to influence the NATO withdrawal and future political setup in Kabul—in other words, endgame hedging and meddling by key neighborhood stakeholders.
The survey addressed two controversial issues with historical backdrop—which the government usually avoids as discussion topics—namely, border demarcation and water rights. The question of demarcating the Durand Line, drawn in 1893 during colonial times, was deemed the most pressing bilateral issue with Pakistan. Most Afghans questioned favored a referendum, and a majority of Pashtun interviewees favored a traditional consultative Loya Jirga. This demonstrates a high degree of willingness to consult and determine the fate of the controversial colonial boundaries.
Majority want to end the war by discussing incentives but not at any cost or from a position of weakness. Uncertain of the future and fearful of a return to the chaos of the 1990s, including Taliban-style oppression, more than half of the respondents did not believe that the current decision makers within the Taliban would agree to the constitution as it stands or to participate in the political process, including elections. This group believed that Taliban leaders committed to a narrower interpretation of sharia and the reestablishment of the Islamic Emirate are leaving almost no room for compromise in future peace talks. The perception was that they would reject democratic rights and gender rights as enshrined in the constitution and would insist on the full withdrawal of NATO and U.S. forces after 2014.”