The US Institute of Peace has published two important papers on Afghanistan in the past week. Afghan Perceptions of the Electoral Process is one of them that cover wide range of issues related to the theme in survey analysis conducted by political anthropologist Noah Coburn and Anna Larson. Their book, Derailing Democracy: Elections and the Reshaping of the Afghan Political Landscape is forthcoming. Below are excerpts from the report. Readers interested in the topic can visit USIP website for the full report.
“Afghan voters spoke of earlier rounds of voting in 2004, 2005, 2009, and 2010 as having had a cumulatively negative effect in terms of encouraging officials to be more corrupt, destabilizing local political balances, and resulting in less equitable access to power and resources”.
Despite these developments, many respondents also described the ideals associated with elections in a positive way and felt that they were a potentially useful means through which to transfer power but had failed to live up to this potential due to manipulation by Afghan leaders and a lack of coherent support by international donors.
The understanding of many respondents of what constitutes a “free and fair” election, however, differed in several ways from what might be considered a Western approach to elections.
While people did express concern about whether elections were likely to be free and fair and often detailed how elections had not been transparent in the past, most were much more concerned with the uncertainty of the upcoming political transition than they were with the process of the elections themselves. Elections were part of a much broader debate on relations with the Taliban, the drawdown of foreign forces, the breakdown of the tenuous connections between ethnic leaders built by Karzai, and the political and economic effects of the decrease in international aid.
A prevailing concern was that as elections approached, there would be less incentive for national and regional level power holders to remain allied with the government and stay within the current system. Elections were considered likely to promote political chaos and, potentially, civil war as international troops leave and current coalitions break apart.
Respondents implied that the Karzai administration represents both the best and worst aspects of a presidential system—maintaining the ability (albeit personalized) to hold loose coalitions of ethnic and other leaders together but, at the same time, exerting overbearing control with little oversight.
Elections will only be perceived as free and fair if there is a significant incentive for a wide range of political actors to continue participating in the political process. There is a need for both Afghan leaders and international diplomats to work to ensure the participation of as many groups and political leaders as possible.
Two Types of Electoral Fraud
The fraud that occurred in the 2009 and 2010 elections in particular has shaped the way that people perceive the authority of their current representatives. As one man explained, “This situation has given people the feeling that the MPs in Parliament are not their real representatives, and that they have gotten into Parliament through fraudulent elections, which were merely empty symbols.” Such accounts suggest the fraud of 2009 and 2010 undermined the Karzai administration, the legislature, and the election process more generally, leading to a resignation that, since the next elections will be flawed, the process will not be less important than its outcomes. While respondents blamed a variety of Afghan political figures—including the president, the head of the Independent Electoral Commission (IEC), and others for fraud—they also expressed a clear frustration with the international community for not having done enough to prevent fraud and also for engineering the results.
Ultimately, however, most of the blame fell on the central government for having set a bad example from the top. One district governor (a Karzai-appointed official) suggested, “Bullying, fraud, and bribery should be solved from the center to the base. A lamp is a good example of this; if it is bright in the center, it can illuminate objects around it very well.” There was little expectation that the government would work to ensure greater transparency in the upcoming elections.
Instead of using fraud as a blanket term covering all aspects of electoral malpractice, respondents indicated a distinction between two types of fraudulent activity: local-level, observable fraud, and national-level manipulation of the results. On a local level, many described watching voters voting multiple times or candidate agents putting pressure on IEC officials to change figures. Respondents in Qara Bagh explained how local supporters of certain candidates set up stations where ink could be washed off the fingers of voters systematically, using bleach and other chemicals provided in bulk by the candidates. In other instances, local leaders and supporters of candidates stood inside, or just outside of, polling stations, pressuring voters to vote for a specific candidate, sometimes offering financial incentives.
Interestingly, most respondents seemed to imply that examples of local-level fraud were of minor concern or solvable. Some suggested a more effective voting card system. Others thought a more active police presence (or simply a less biased one) or more international monitors could reduce cheating at the polls.”
Elections and Transition in 2014
This report has outlined some of the many fears of Afghan respondents about the 2014 elections and in particular the overall concern that the polls might exacerbate existing tensions and internal conflict. Across all the data collected, however, respondents still indicated that the elections would constitute a necessary component of the overall transition. We argue that in order for the elections to take place without adding to insecurity, they must display the following three characteristics: first, they need to function as a mechanism that promotes greater political inclusion than any alternative option; second, they need to continue to act as a symbol of change from the disorder of past regimes; and finally, they need to address the immediate needs of the current transition while simultaneously promoting longer-term political reform.
The Need for Broad Political Participation
“Afghans and international observers broadly agree that the main hope for a stable national Afghan government is one that includes as many parties to the current conflict as possible. This is a strong shift from the early post-2001 period when the U.S. government, in particular, pushed for a political system with a strong president, discouraging the meaningful participation of a wide variety of other groups. In comparison, the past five years have seen increasing attempts at reconciliation and “reintegration” programs to bring moderate Taliban forces onto the government side, although these have been largely unsuccessful.
For most respondents, who were clearly concerned about the political uncertainty generated by the elections, the participation of as broad a spectrum of political actors as possible might not, in itself, signal that the elections have been free and fair, but it would symbolize at least an initial desire by those involved to remain or become part of a national process of politics and state building. Electoral participation signals to voters that there is at least a minimal commitment from political actors, ranging from local commanders to national-level leaders to the Afghan government. An inclusive process, involving as many political groups as possible, would make an important statement about the future of the Afghan national government.
On the one hand, even “moderately successful” elections—ones that are able to take place across the country without marginalizing certain people or groups due to insecurity, for example—would be a strong statement in support of a new government that is at least symbolically accountable to a voting public. On the other hand, the refusal of certain key political leaders to participate, coupled with poor voter turnout, would send a clear signal to antigovernment forces of illegitimacy, indicating further opportunities for power grabbing and a means to further benefit from instability.
The Need to Combine the Current Transition with Long-Term Reforms
“Technical reforms of the electoral process are necessary to improve polling, as many international and Afghan election observer reports have detailed. But the kinds of reforms that are feasible within the diminishing timeframe before the next election are unlikely to make a significant difference to the way elections are perceived by Afghans in 2014. Looking back to the distinction that respondents made between local-level fraud and national-scale manipulation of results, it is possible to see how technical reforms—such as the provision of more international observers or a rethink of the way in which voting cards are stamped—would address the first but not the second of these issues. While necessary to rebuilding local confidence in the value of voting in the long term, these reforms will not address the fundamental concerns of elite bargaining and control of outcomes in the short term.
“If elections in 2014 are to contribute to a stable transition, they must contribute to negotiations within the peace process by providing a platform for the expression of local community interests. As the authors’ past research shows, local communities used elections in lieu of a reliable census to demonstrate size and influence and to generate a sense of entitlement to development aid. While perhaps not a conventional approach to elections as might be practiced in the West—and likely still tainted with local-level fraud—this nevertheless demonstrates the way in which polls can be considered useful by local communities as a means to demonstrate their claim to a stake in central government resources.
Such an approach could increase the sense of inclusion of communities within negotiations, both with the Taliban and other political groups involved in the transition. While not eliminating the chances of elite manipulation, this could counter the prevailing perspective that current political negotiations only involve a very small number of elites in Kabul. It would promote the inclusion of local leaders, who could in turn pressure national elites to commit to such a process. In addition, this should be combined with a comprehensive, long-term plan for electoral reform in the mid to long term, including international support to the IEC planned for 2014–17, that is communicated clearly to the electorate. Sending a message about the importance of transparency at the local level will indicate the post-2014 commitment of international actors to the establishment of a trustworthy political system.
Ultimately, by focusing on inclusivity and the symbolic potential and contribution of elections to high-level negotiations, elections could be more firmly embedded within the overall transition. This focus would decrease fears about Afghanistan’s political future and encourage groups at all levels to support more transparent and democratic processes. For this to happen, international actors must see elections as an integral part of the political process and not simply as another technical event in isolation from the political landscape in which they are taking place.”