Editor in Chief: Moh. Reza Huwaida Thursday, March 28th, 2024

The Challenges of Negotiating with the Taliban

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The Challenges of Negotiating  with the Taliban

On Tuesday, June 18th, 2013, four major news-items collided in the headlines on Afghanistan. The first was the official security handover by the International Security Assistance Forces (ISAF) of remaining 95 districts in Southern and Eastern regions to the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF). The second was a suicide bomb blast in Western Kabul that killed 3 and wounded more than 20. The third was a Taliban mortar attack on Bagram Air Base, which killed 4 US soldiers. And the fourth was the opening of the Taliban office in Doha, Qatar ahead of supposed peace talks.

A day later, while Afghan and American families in Kabul, Florida, South Carolina, and Texas mourned their dead, the high drama on the news was about the Taliban office in Qatar. Like a testy teenager, the Taliban delegation at the Doha office had immediately flaunted their disregard for the Afghan government and negotiation process by raising the movement’s old white flag and dubbing their villa the “Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan” – the name they used when in power. To an outraged Karzai, this made the Doha office look like a rival government in exile instead of a political bureau for negotiations – and indeed their actions violated agreements made with both Qatar and the U.S. Simultaneously, it was evident that the Taliban’s approach to negotiations did not include a moratorium on indiscriminately killing and wounding Afghan citizens or stopping attacks on Afghan government officials and their international allies. Perhaps more significantly, since ceasefires themselves can take time to negotiate, the Taliban approach did not even appear to respect the Afghan constitution, flag, or Afghan leaders’ painstakingly developed Peace Process Roadmap to 2015. Although they did eventually take the sign down—despite much ire inside the cream-colored walls—and sort of took the flag down, the statement was made. (Oh, and just to make sure their message was clear, they launched an attack on the presidential palace the next week.)

 It’s clear enough why the Taliban would want to go through this seemingly ludicrous political theater. Their motivation seems to be pretty much the same as always: legitimacy, power, and the psychological advantage. The more puzzling question is: why is the U.S. falling over themselves to help them? Have U.S. political leaders really fallen for this ruse? Knowing the Taliban, any overtures to negotiate should be examined with extreme caution and skepticism, realizing that in the past the Taliban have been willing to say whatever is necessary to manipulate their way to position and power. With ISAF and NATO already on their way to delivering on their #1 demand (all foreign forces out), they are hardly desperate. PLUS, they still have a safe haven, funding, and an endless source of newly trained recruits, all facilitated by Pakistan.

In official statements, Pakistan was supportive of the negotiation efforts and confirmed that it facilitated opening the Taliban office in Doha. But of course, as Afghan journalist and analyst Ibrahim Nasar puts it, “The Pakistan-plus-Taliban side is secretive. It’s not known how much independence the Taliban have in the current peace process and how much of influence the Pakistani intelligence and military have.” Regardless of what insiders agree or disagree on, that things haven’t looked so disastrously good for the Taliban in a long time, argues author and analyst Terry Glavin in his incisive article for the Ottowa citizen (which is worth particular attention because he is Canadian – and seems to say more freely and clearly what Americans need to hear).

 If we go a bit deeper, there is quite a disconnect between the Taliban leadership carrying out their Doha-stunt and fighters on the ground, who seemed more forthright about their intentions. No doubt reflecting his excellent training, a Taliban fighter in Uruzgan notes, “When a person is ready to get killed or kill the enemy, he does not care [about] talks. We want a pure Islamic government…we will never join the current government established by the West, where Islamic laws are violated.” These comments illustrate what experts have long maintained: that the Taliban, like any insurgency, is not monolithic. While some fighters, like the one quoted above, are driven by ideology, others are driven by more malleable motivations—like economic desperation. Some are driven by grievances that, if addressed, could lead to reconciliation. And while the Taliban do not have broad support among the Afghan people, especially the increasingly-educated youth, negotiating with the Taliban—at least with those who demonstrate willingness to meet certain basic requirements—is possible. That is the official position of the Afghan government, as expressed by Janan Mosazai, director of strategic communications for Afghanistan’s High Peace Council. “The Afghan government will continue to fight those Taliban who are against the peace, security and prosperity of the Afghan people. But the Afghan government will negotiate with Talibs who commit themselves to peace, national unity, the constitutional democratic order “and the historic achievements of the past decade, including the rights and freedoms of all Afghans, men and women.”

The latest murkiness of larger-scale negotiations resulting from the U.S.-supported Taliban antics in Doha has discouraged many observers who believe a negotiated political settlement is the only solution to the conflict in Afghanistan. But the U.S. would be wise to take its cues from the Afghan government and people, and not rush too fast into the arms of its long-duplicitous Taliban+Pakistan foe. Regardless of whether or when the Taliban decide to get serious about peace (and we all hope they do), the timeline for negotiations should not be tied to an artificial timeline for the withdrawal of international forces. The roles of external players, especially the U.S., should be clearly defined. And international troops remaining in the country should re-focus their efforts on building ties with local communities and addressing the real concerns of Afghan citizens, such as the corruption endemic that fuels the insurgency.

 Meanwhile, Afghans have made several things clear: negotiations should be done on Afghan terms, and on Afghan soil. The current government, whatever its flaws (and there are many), must be respected. And civil society representatives of the Afghan people, especially women (who rightly feel their fate is in the balance if the Taliban are allowed to share power in Afghanistan), must be involved in the process. As Afghan ambassador to India, Shaida M. Abdali deftly put it: “The Afghan people have not been losing their children day after day, year after year, just to return to the same foreign-installed ‘Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan’ that violated the very basic human rights of Afghan women, and that harbored al-Qaeda, which first terrorized the Afghan people and then masterminded the tragedy of 9/11.”

Farzana Marie is the President of Civil Vision International, a non-profit organization whose present focus is positively influencing U.S.-Afghanistan relations through connecting, informing, and inspiring citizens of both countries. She served as a volunteer teacher in Kabul orphanages in 2003 and 2004, and later returned to Afghanistan as a U.S. Air Force officer, serving in outreach and anti-corrupt

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